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Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection 
Systems: Lessons from the Hanford Council 
Experience 
Jonathan Brock, Associate Professor Emeritus, University of 
Washington 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to understand and assess the factors that help or hinder 
                                                                                                                              
  In addition to readily available sources, the observations in this article benefit from 
more than three decades of research and practice activities by the author in a broad range 
of workplace and policy disputes.  This background includes the author’s involvement in 
the study team assembled at the University of Washington that in 1992 initially 
recommended the adoption of a new whistleblower dispute resolution system at Hanford, 
and then his becoming the founding chairperson of the Hanford Joint Council (Hanford 
Council), where he has overseen several iterations of the system. This initial study and 
subsequent work has allowed comparison with results of whistleblower cases handled 
through the Council system versus those handled through other more common processes, 
including processes sponsored by government contractors and by the Department of 
Energy (DOE), and cases handled through litigation, or through processes offered 
through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).   
 In addition to this direct experience at Hanford, much of the conceptual background 
for the comparisons in this article comes from experience in assessing as well as assisting 
in the mediation of workplace and policy disputes and helping establishing systems to do 
so—in fields ranging from health care, transportation, firefighting to land use, 
agriculture, and others.  Some of this work was done as the founding director of the 
William D. Ruckelshaus Center, under the guidance of board chair William D. 
Ruckelshaus.  In this and other professorial and research roles, he has examined dozens 
of significant policy and workplace conflict resolution events and systems in the Pacific 
Northwest and elsewhere in the country.  
 Other aspects of the analysis herein benefit from his experience in workplace policy 
and regulatory issues as a result of serving three US secretaries of labor, and time on the 
staff of an early OSHA assistant secretary.  Several published works by the author have 
received recognition for their contributions to workplace dispute resolution theory and 
practice. He was recently appointed by the US Secretary of Labor to the new 
Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee.  
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resolution of whistleblower conflicts, this paper draws lessons from a 
voluntary whistleblower case resolution system—the Hanford Concerns 
Council (Hanford Council, or Council) system—that has operated 
successfully over a sixteen year period. The Hanford Council system 
supplements existing regulatory and administrative mechanisms for 
handling whistleblower rights and concerns.  It came into being after years 
of protracted public controversies and related court battles over 
whistleblower cases at the Hanford Nuclear site in Southwest Washington 
State stemming from the failure of then existing mechanisms to address 
these conflicts.1 The site was part of the production complex for nuclear 
weapons materials during World War II and the Cold War. By the early 
1990s, when the Hanford Council system was established, the site mission 
had already shifted from production of nuclear fuel to the cleanup of the 
highly contaminated site near the Columbia River. 
In 1992, in response to the controversies over whistleblower issues, and 
at the request of Christine O. Gregoire, then director of the Washington 
State Department of Ecology, the University of Washington’s (UW) 
Institute for Public Policy and Management conducted a study of the way 
whistleblower issues were handled at Hanford. Based on the gaps in 
process, practice, and tools and using best practices as a reference, the UW 
study produced the principles that led to the Council system. The Council 
system that emerged was structured, and has been further refined, to correct 
for the particular difficulties, barriers, and gaps often found when 
employees try to exercise whistleblower rights and employers try to respond 
within the usual structures and assumptions available.2 
                                                                                                                              
1 E.g., Jonathan Brock, Full and Fair Resolution of Whistleblower Issues: the Hanford 
Joint Council, A Pilot ADR Approach, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 497, 498–501 (1999) 
[hereinafter Brock, Full and Fair Resolution] (summarizing resolution of prior 
controversies). 
2 See generally Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., External Third-Party Review of Significant 
Employee Concerns: The Joint Cooperative Council for Hanford Disputes (Univ. of 
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In accordance with the principles developed, the Hanford Council system 
is independent of internal systems handled by companies and agencies, but 
is mindful of those systems and their roles and impact and connects to them 
in carefully restructured ways that promote resolution of whistleblower 
issues. This paper recognizes that while many whistleblower cases are 
handled effectively by the internal systems of some companies and the 
systems offered by some agencies, many more are not handled effectively—
largely because of structural problems and missing features of these 
systems. While the Council example is specific in its application to Hanford 
and, perhaps, government nuclear facilities, this assessment is intended to 
suggest common limitations in the characteristics of many whistleblower 
protection programs and to identify features and principles that may, in a 
wider variety of circumstances, be applicable. 
These common limitations often preclude the stable resolution of the 
problem that has been raised and, further, generally lead to a failure to 
actually protect and encourage the right to blow the whistle. This means that 
the purposes of national policies—to encourage or protect whistleblowers 
and to gain the benefit of addressing problems that may need attention in 
our institutions—often are not met by the systems and practices that 
typically flow from policies intended to benefit whistleblowing. This article 
will examine these and other frequently found barriers to the effective 
handling of whistleblower cases and describe what can be learned from the 
Hanford Council system to help overcome these barriers, even within the 
context of existing policies, programs, and processes. 
Using the expanded scope, tools and approaches it has available, the 
Hanford Council system has developed a strong track record of resolving 
cases that had eluded, or were projected to elude, resolution in the normally 
available systems. Similar disputes at Hanford that have not gone through 
                                                                                                                              
Wash. Graduate Sch. of Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 93–99, 1992), available at 
http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/council_resources_uwpapers.pdf. 
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the Hanford Council system have more often resulted in six and seven 
figure settlements, equally large legal costs, and significant disruption to 
operations and workplace relationships, usually resulting in job loss for 
affected employees and, often, for some involved managers. Every conflict 
accepted into the Hanford Council system has resulted in a mediated 
resolution, usually with minimal disruption.   
In most instances, the Hanford Council system not only addresses 
retaliation against employees who have blown the whistle, but also 
addresses underlying safety systems issues, policies, management practices, 
and, often, relationship and cultural issues contributing to the 
misunderstandings and behaviors in the workplace that spawned the original 
problem or dispute. Such broader results, particularly where the underlying 
substantive issue is resolved and the relationship of the employee and the 
company is repaired, are rare in the more typical application of 
whistleblower rights.  The Council system is also able to help an employee 
accept a result where the issue turned out to be less significant than the 
employee may initially have thought or where the employee’s own skills at 
raising issues could be improved, and to smooth the way for a restored 
workplace relationship.   
However, among the lessons to be learned from the Hanford Council 
model is the fact that much can be improved in the outcome of 
whistleblower conflicts within existing statutory and regulatory 
frameworks. An important part of the success of the Hanford Council 
alternative is that it is structured to supplement, and often relies on rights 
and responsibilities established by existing programs. The features 
discussed below are important to the success of such supplemental 
mechanisms. Many of them could become features of existing company or 
government programs, though the specific law, industry, and agency 
jurisdiction and characteristics will affect what is possible and what are to 
be the most important considerations. Some laws, as well as some agency or 
company practices or traditions, will restrict the degree of potential 
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adoption of these features, and, certainly, statutory and regulatory change 
would be valuable in many areas. But such changes are not essential to gain 
improvements in existing programs. Of course, reform only comes by the 
will of leadership and the willingness of authoritative or affected parties to 
support or cooperate. 
The following simple features, if used together and adapted to match the 
circumstances, are key ingredients to supplement existing whistleblower 
protection schemes. The result need not look like the Hanford Council, but 
can take a form that matches up to the needs of the circumstances. 
1. Independence of the mechanism handling the dispute. 
2. Strict confidentiality of the process. 
3. Ability to “stabilize” or “freeze” the dispute and avoid further 
escalation while it is being addressed. 
4. Ability to protect and support the employee (and protect 
management from committing or exacerbating potential violations) 
during the resolution process. 
5. Emphasis on resolution in a non-adversarial process, while 
preserving the rights of the parties to access adversarial channels. 
6. Precluding individuals and offices with a vested interest (see below 
for details) in the outcome from influencing the evaluation and the 
resolution of the claim by the independent mechanism.  
7. Flexibility in tools and processes so that the tools fit the issues. 
8. Focus on problem solving rather than on the assignment of blame. 
9. Involvement of managers with program knowledge and broad 
responsibility rather than delegation to specialized offices or 
functions. Involvement of non-company and non-agency parties, 
including employee advocates. 
10. Mandate for comprehensive solutions (both the substantive and the 
relationship issues in the situation) and not limiting the inquiry to  an 
exploration of alleged violations of employment rights. 
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11. Connection of the system to existing authorities for action or policy 
change, and protection of rights, provision of opportunities for quiet 
assessment and resolution, and accountability for fair outcomes. 
12. Mutual confidence of leaders in the affected employer and of 
employee communities in the fairness of the system.  
The Hanford Council system allows the employer to respond positively 
within the dispute process. Employer cooperation is much more likely when 
the employer is not immediately faced with adversarial proceedings and the 
attendant risks for individual and corporate goals. Resistance is similarly 
lessened when the employer is given the chance to avoid organizational 
disruption and to learn useful lessons without a public spanking. In contrast, 
the adversarial systems within many statutory programs and internal 
problem solving systems do not, in fact, focus on problem solving, but 
instead encourage significant effort on avoiding or fixing blame.  
By developing a system that steers away from these common but 
unfortunate incentives, the Council system has side-stepped litigated cases 
entirely, minimized operational disruption and diversion of management 
and union leadership resources, saved careers of both managers and 
workers, and improved safety practices. Comparing cases of employees not 
eligible for the Hanford system with cases that have gone through the 
Hanford system shows starkly different results for individuals and 
companies, different levels of impact on the issues raised by the 
whistleblowers, and different results in the willingness of employees to 
bring issues forward and of management to engage in problem solving, not 
to mention the starkly different financial impacts.3 The benefits that stem 
from the avoidance of project and mission disruption and of work group 
                                                                                                                              
3 See Built on an Established History of Success, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/council_history.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2012); 
see also Council Ensures that Mediation Beats Litigation, TRI-CITY HERALD, Aug. 12, 
2008, http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/press_ 
tricityherald20080812.pdf. 
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relationships should not be overlooked. 
Experience with the Hanford Council system suggests that win-win 
solutions are usually possible and that conflict elements are rarely 
irreconcilable. If more attention is given to supplementing existing systems 
and authorities with the important features listed above, gains can be made 
in worker protections, and opportunities can arise for addressing important 
organizational and work site problems. By supplementing existing systems 
to encourage people to come forward and companies to cooperate, while 
lowering the risks to both parties, national whistleblower policies and 
derivative systems could more likely serve their goals. Therefore, 
examination of the Hanford Council system in more detail may have 
benefits in evaluating important alternative approaches and in identifying 
useful tools. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE HANFORD COUNCIL SYSTEM 
The Hanford Council system4 has been in operation at the Hanford 
Nuclear Site near Richland, WA, for sixteen of the last eighteen years. The 
Council has received approximately 140 cases.5 Based on internal Council 
record keeping, the Council has resolved 100 percent of the cases it 
accepted for resolution through its system (of cases received, approximately 
half have been accepted).6 Cases are reviewed through an intake process,7 
during which the Council determines if it has the jurisdiction and tools to be 
of assistance or if the situation can be handled more effectively by other 
means. The merits of the cases are not judged until a more complete 
                                                                                                                              
4 Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1 (describing the basic design features 
and the means of their development for the Hanford Council system). 
5  First-hand observation of Council case activities and knowledge of case outcomes. 
6  Id. 
7 Council Charter, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL § 7.3 (June 1, 2008), 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/council_charter.pdf [hereinafter 
Charter] (referencing the “triage” of cases at intake). 
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assessment of the issues is performed. Resolution means that the Council’s 
recommendation is a consensus recommendation and is accepted by the 
affected employer and by the employee who brought forward the 
complaint.8 The Council possesses special authorities granted by the 
Hanford Concerns Council Charter (Charter)9 agreement, which defines the 
Council’s responsibilities and authorities for intervention in whistleblower 
disputes. The Charter, agreed to by participating companies and the major 
advocacy group at the site, and approved by the US Department of Energy 
(DOE),10 restricts the Council’s jurisdiction to cases concerning workplace 
and environmental safety and health issues. Within that scope, however, the 
Charter provides a great deal of flexibility in the tools applied to resolve 
each situation.  
The Council does not deal with, among other things, whistleblowing on 
financial issues, classified information, or health benefit claims related to 
incidents involving nuclear or workplace safety, though many of its cases 
contain such incidents or issues. The Charter pledges that the Council will 
not interfere in established collective bargaining rights, though most of its 
cases involve bargaining unit employees. Worker compensation programs 
and insurance systems make health benefit determinations, but many of 
those coming to the Council have, and retain, rights to make such claims.11 
                                                                                                                              
8 First-hand observation of Council case activities and knowledge of case outcomes. 
9 Charter, supra note 7 (describing the Council’s unique grant of authority from the 
parties and the ways in which it can operate to exercise this authority). 
10 Presumption Implementation Brings Closure to Disputes, HANFORD CONCERNS 
COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_corporate.htm (last visited Dec. 
18, 2012); A Less Costly and Time Consuming Method of Conflict Resolution, HANFORD 
CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_doeorp.htm (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2012); Advocacy Participation Ensures a Fair Hearing, HANFORD 
CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_interestgroup.htm 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2012). 
11 Charter, supra note 7, §§ 1.1, 1.2.2. 
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The Council uses an unusual form of mediation,12 combining several 
considerations into its assessment and recommendations: the impacts on the 
individual’s career trajectory as a result of the conflict,13 any actual safety 
problems that may require attention,14 any underlying systems or workplace 
problems,15 and the importance of promoting a safety-conscious work 
environment and a safe and productive cleanup of the Hanford site. To 
produce a recommendation that is accepted by the employee and 
implemented by the company, the Council uses a mediation system that 
begins with its own, independent assessment of the situation. Unlike 
adversarial proceedings, this assessment is undertaken jointly by specially 
selected16 representatives of the company and of whistleblower advocacy 
groups who are members of the Council. Their joint work product provides 
a factual basis for addressing the issues, and is not intended to establish 
blame, but address the problems and the conflict that has resulted.17  
                                                                                                                              
12 A Membership That Ensures Neutrality, HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/doc/work_neutrality.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 
2012) (summarizing the uniqueness of the mediation system). 
13 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 2010 PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_progressreport2010.pdf 
[hereinafter HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT]. 
14 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org (last visited Dec. 
18, 2012) (describing how the Hanford Concerns Council can address safety issues); 
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 501–02. 
15 See, e.g., PATRICK N. BREYSSE & MARK R. STENZEL, INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL 
REPORT ON CHEMICAL VAPORS INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE STRATEGY, HANFORD 
CONCERNS COUNCIL (2010), http://hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/report_irp_ 
20101027.pdf. These recommendations were substantially adopted by Washington River 
Protection Systems, effectively ending years of conflict and whistleblower cases 
concerning chemical vapors at the site. Id. 
16 Charter, supra note 7, § 4.5 (describing selection and appointment of members); see 
Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 517–19 (discussing membership roles 
and dynamics). 
17 Author’s observation of the Council system. The assessment phase provides an agreed 
upon factual basis from which consensus on a resolution can be sought to address the full 
range of issues, including employment rights, safety and health practices, and systems 
improvements, as appropriate to the case. 
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This mediation system is unlike the more common mediation format in a 
litigated case, or in an arbitrated case, in which each side presents its case or 
proposal and the mediator or arbitrator makes or helps the parties make a 
decision, or in which the parties simply try to reach an agreement on a 
dollar figure. Because the statutes that often spawn these mediated 
opportunities only guarantee employment rights, mediation sessions under 
existing statutory mediation programs are not commonly used to address the 
actual issues about which employees were concerned or to make other 
changes dictated by underlying circumstances.18 Instead, these more 
traditional mediations usually only address the issue of employment status.  
Several prominent attorneys that represent whistleblowers, and who have 
observed the Hanford Council system first hand, have commented on how 
much more information is gathered—and far more quickly—than in any of 
the more usual adversarial proceedings.19 Company representatives are 
similarly amazed at the value and degree of problem solving, and the 
improvement in work systems and practices, that can result.20 Much of the 
Council system’s productivity comes from the mutual approach to blame-
free solutions and the related lack of adversarial proceedings.  Other factors 
are also crucial, as will be discussed below.  
The Hanford Council handles only highly polarized or complex cases that 
are not expected to be susceptible to solution through normal in-house, 
administrative, judicial, or arbitration channels.21 Assessment of the facts 
                                                                                                                              
18 See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 500–02 (describing how 
traditional and statutory programs were largely restricted to employment rights issues or 
narrower conceptions of the conflict than could resolve the conflict); Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1), (b)(1) (2005) (describing where the 
right is defined related to employment discrimination, such as discharge or adverse action 
related to employment). 
19 Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 514. 
20 Discussions with present and former company representatives. 
21 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, supra note 14. The ability to resolve cases not 
expected to be addressable by other channels is noted on the Council web site home page, 
as is the point that corporate, advocacy, and neutral perspectives are at the table. Id. 
 
Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection Systems 583 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013 
and development of a solution is carried on in the Council among its 
specially appointed representatives and under the Council’s rules. Thus, the 
issues are considered among members that will understand the employee 
advocacy point of view and the company view, but who are not directly 
involved in the conflict and who would not be permitted to continue their 
involvement if the matter ultimately proceeded to litigation. An additional 
group of “neutral” members, previously unaffiliated with Hanford, are 
appointed to provide balance to the “seats” in this group.22 
The assessment process starts with gathering information from the 
affected employee, the company, witnesses and experts, and collecting and 
reviewing relevant documents and analyses. The Council can revisit any of 
these sources for clarification. The information is reviewed, and the Council 
members seek to reach a consensus regarding what actually gave rise to the 
conflict and what would be fair, necessary and appropriate to resolve it. 
With guidance from the full Council, the initial work is usually done in a 
subcommittee that contains at least one representative from each seat 
(company, advocate, neutral). As a group, subcommittee members review 
all of the available information and participate equally in determining what 
should be examined. The subcommittee distills the information and brings it 
to the full Council for further assessment and guidance, and later for review 
of suggested resolution principles or recommendations. At various points in 
the process, the Council reviews the subcommittee’s progress and checks on 
open questions with the affected company and employee as it moves 
towards a resolution. Eventually, the subcommittee will bring a framework 
for resolution or a draft recommendation to the full Council for review, 
                                                                                                                              
These representatives who are uninvolved with the dispute, but affiliated with the 
perspectives in the dispute, are the ones that have the responsibility to resolve it, rather 
than those whose emotions have been aroused, often in a lengthy conflict. Id. 
22 Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2, at 7–8 (noting use of neutral members), and 
See generally Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1. 
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development, or any needed refinement.23  
While the advocacy and company perspectives differ, all members are 
individually appointed and share a commitment to the Council resolution 
process and to reaching a consensus on a reasonable resolution. As a result 
of working together, the group develops trust and working relationships that 
allow robust examination of the data, and carrying out of interviews and 
other analysis of the situation with a common goal. This is accomplished 
without the polarization and suspicion common to whistleblower conflicts 
and related resolution systems. This work is detailed, painstaking, and often 
difficult. The quality and value of the resolutions must be seen, first, in 
comparison to similar cases not handled through the Council system, but, 
rather, through the other available systems, to which even a poor Council 
resolution inevitably compares extremely well in terms of direct and 
indirect costs. The depth and breadth achieved in a particular case will vary 
depending upon the factors particular to each case and the context in which 
the case emerges.24   
The Council has authority to take “stabilization” actions that are used to 
preclude or reduce the impact of additional or escalated conflict between the 
involved parties while the case is being processed. Such actions are rarely 
available in other systems. Whistleblower cases fought through the normal 
channels usually produce enormous stress for affected employees and often 
for their supervisors—not to mention their families.25 Stabilization actions 
                                                                                                                              
23 Author’s observations of Council case processing. 
24 Author’s observations of results and of the reactions of employees, company 
leadership, Council members, government officials and others regarding Council 
resolutions, and specific cost and impact comparisons regularly made by the Council in 
examining outcomes of cases outside the system, compared to costs and impacts of 
similar cases handled inside. 
25 E.g., Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, Whistleblower Protections for Government 
Contractors, HSGAC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT (Dec. 6, 2011) 
(statement by Dr. Walter Tomosaitis), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ 
subcommittees/contracting-oversight/hearings/whistleblower-protections-for-
government-contractors. See also STEPHEN MARTIN KOHN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER’S 
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are used to preclude or address any further conflict among the involved 
parties, which can include temporary transfers or less formal intervention in 
the day-to-day conflict that otherwise seems to naturally occur when a 
whistleblower case is being adjudicated through many other systems. By 
consulting closely with the employee and employer, these stabilization 
actions are done without disruption to ongoing business or harm to career 
trajectory.26 The Council ordinarily has frequent, sometimes daily or 
weekly, contact with the employee not only to keep him or her informed, 
but also to help him or her cope with the circumstances and stay focused on 
his or her work, or if the employee is off work, on his or her family and 
other things that can help to reduce and manage the stresses that inevitably 
arise.     
The Council tries to convey to both parties that it is handling the situation 
through a blame-free, problem solving approach and that they will be 
involved as needed. Thus, ongoing work can be attended to. When a similar 
case at Hanford takes place outside of the Council, work is regularly 
disrupted for months for dozens of people, including leadership. At times, 
on some projects, work has literally been halted. To help prevent disruption, 
employees with Council cases are encouraged to avoid gossip about their 
situations with co-workers and others. However, the Council urges 
employees with cases in the Council system to find sources of support 
among family, close friends, and, as needed, medical providers.  
                                                                                                                              
HANDBOOK: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO DOING WHAT’S RIGHT AND PROTECTING 
YOURSELF (2011) (describing twenty-one different strategies for how to cope with these 
stresses). See generally MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA M. GLAZER, THE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1989) 
(describing pressures of coming forward as a whistleblower); American Whistleblower 
Tour, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, http://whistleblower.org/action-
center/american-whistleblower-tour (last visited Dec. 18, 2012); HANFORD CHALLENGE, 
http://www.hanfordchallenge.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) 
26 Charter, supra note 7, § 7.5.2 (discussing authority to undertake stabilization actions 
and the need to balance intervention with the ongoing mission to support site operations). 
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This approach also allows the company officials involved in the situation 
to focus on their jobs and reduce the stresses that would come from an 
ongoing daily conflict and the attendant posturing.27 Imposing a relative 
calm around the conflict, resulting from this suspension of the usual 
hostilities, facilitates effective problem solving. More often than not, rather 
than being a function of intended wrongdoing or retaliation, a case is a 
function of misunderstanding, poor practices or tensions, traditions or habits 
in the workplace, or mistakes or ignorance about how to properly deal with 
concerns. Most often, the substantive issue raised by the employee is 
relevant—whether a safety problem, system’s flaw, or mishandling of the 
right to raise issues—but it is not always precisely the issue that the 
employee or management had thought, and it often has dimensions or 
causes that neither side saw clearly and that may have been overestimated 
or underestimated by the involved parties. If any violations of law or 
regulation are found, they must be reported.28 
The benefit of the Hanford Council’s independent initial assessment is 
that these additional aspects of the situation are uncovered, usually allowing 
the fundamental causes to be addressed and the full dimensions of the 
problem to be solved. The typical result is that the employee returns to 
regular and productive work largely, if not entirely, free from the tensions 
and mistrust that led him or her to raise the issues outside the organization.   
Sometimes the resolution prescribes that the employee resumes work in a 
different job or location at the site. Often, a “mentor” or “buffer” person is 
assigned from within the company for a short period of time to aid the 
transition back to normal working relationships and preclude old tensions or 
suspicions from returning.  
                                                                                                                              
27 These actions are seen earlier on in many cases that occur outside Council jurisdiction, 
before the Council has informed those previously involved, and before fully establishing 
its role in the case. 
28   Charter, supra note 7, § 5.7 (describing requirements to report violations) 
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The usual circumstance is that the Hanford Council, following an 
assessment and consideration of an appropriate solution, presents its 
recommendation to the employee and the president of the affected 
company. According to the Charter, the company, with minor exception, is 
bound to accept any consensus recommendation of the Council.29 The 
employee is not bound to accept, but every employee has done so thus far.30 
The Council does not bargain with the parties, but it can modify 
implementation details to better ensure the purpose and implementation of 
the resolution. 
Because of the consultation that has taken place throughout the Council 
process, the proposal for resolution is rarely a surprise to either party. 
Typically, the result is not precisely what either party might have 
anticipated or expected at the outset, but the resolution is usually seen as, at 
least, an acceptable resolution of the issues. With the additional briefings, 
information, and deeper resolution provided by the Council, the parties 
(more often than not) understand the reasoning behind the proposed 
solution,31 which adds to their acceptance of it and commitment to it.  
Because the Council gains from its extensive assessment, it is able to 
develop and integrate information not previously available to or known by 
                                                                                                                              
29 Id. § 2.6.6. 
30 Id. § 2.6. While the Charter is specific in Section 2.6 on the obligation of the 
participating company to implement consensus recommendations except under unusual 
circumstances, it is purposely silent on any obligation of the employee. Id. This is by 
agreement of the Charter parties. Id. The involvement and consensus of employer and 
employee advocacy representatives is the key channel by which the resolutions are 
shaped to be palatable to both sides, but based on the Council’s assessment. Id. Then, 
they can be presented in a way that demonstrates the benefits and the tradeoffs to each, 
resulting in acceptance. Id. Usually, the president of the company and the employee are 
consulted along the way so that they are informed of the findings once they emerge. Id. 
This often alters the perspective held by one or both sides and lays the groundwork for 
development and later acceptance of the Council’s proposed resolution, which is 
effectively mediated inside the Council and provided to the parties. Id. 
31 Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 515–16 (describing gaining 
acceptance of the process for maintaining employee/employer relations). 
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either of the parties. And because it is able to apply its combined 
perspectives to find a resolution, the resolution is different, and usually 
more robust and stable, than either party would likely have achieved 
through other channels.  
Quite often the degree of satisfaction and restoration of work 
relationships for both parties is substantial. At a minimum, the company has 
avoided litigation, protracted instability, or other management, mission, or 
business risks or interruptions, while the employee has been relieved of 
stresses and uncertainties, and finds some vindication in the exercise of his 
or her rights, as well as hope for future protection and less stressful working 
conditions. There have been a few cases where the relationship has soured 
and further conflict has taken place following the resolution, often due to 
transitions within the company or other changes related to site 
responsibilities.   
As noted in the Charter agreement, consensus is necessary to ensure 
company acceptance of a case recommendation.32 To reach consensus, all 
Council members who are eligible to participate in the case must be in 
agreement. The members who are eligible to participate in a case generally 
include three members from the affected company, three members 
representing employee advocacy organizations, three neutral representatives 
with no ties to Hanford companies or interests, and a neutral chairperson.33 
Consensus comes about partly because of the recognition by the 
Council’s participating advocacy groups and corporate members and DOE 
leadership that the alternatives are inevitably worse just by their nature. 
They typically involve extensive depositions, investigations, and other 
litigation costs, as well as the debilitating indirect impacts and costs on 
working relationships, reputations, public confidence in the competence of 
government and contractors, and, often, on the progress of the nuclear 
                                                                                                                              
32 Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6. 
33 Id. §§ 4.2, 3.2. 
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clean-up work. As noted, these adversarial methods may also create 
disruptions in the personal lives of managers and employees, such as 
diversion from work, as well as attendant conflicts, stresses, and tensions.34 
Because so many factors are usually involved, the employment rights 
remedy—one of the most common bases for whistleblower statutes35—will 
not likely address the roots of the conflict. Therefore, such remedy does not 
permit a resolution that can normally lead to stability. Nor can it address the 
policy goals of fixing an organizational problem and making it safe for 
employees to raise, and employers to work on, issues that will improve 
practices or meet some other intended public standard. 
In contrast, the absence of assigned blame in the Council system 
broadens the focus of the process, changes the behavior of the parties, and, 
therefore, the outcomes.36 Few Council cases involve monetary settlements, 
perhaps because of the interest of the parties in addressing the actual issues 
and the ability of the system to actually do so, particularly in a blame-free 
manner. Most employees blow the whistle to solve a problem that they see 
at work. If the resolution solves the problem and gives them a reasonable 
assurance for a stable future employment relationship, money is not needed 
to resolve the matter.37 This pattern of positive outcomes for both parties 
                                                                                                                              
34 See generally TRI-CITY HERALD, supra note 3; HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, 
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 2, 5 (quoting Christine Gregoire); Brock, Full and 
Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 502–03 (quoting former US DOE secretary, Hazel 
O’Leary). 
35 Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 501–02 (concerning limitations of 
common whistleblower protection programs). See also Thomas M. Devine, The 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment 
Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531 (1999). 
36 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 4 (stating 
approaches that avoid blame and seek comprehensive solutions that have both the 
potential to restore the employment relationship and actually protect employment rights). 
37 One pattern I have observed is that in the early part of a case, before substantive 
solutions are found, discussions or demands about dollars are in rather high numbers. 
Those numbers drop or disappear the more complete the resolution is relative to the real 
concerns and career impacts. Most cases where money is part of the resolution are those 
 
590 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
demonstrates the value of dealing substantively and honorably with the 
concerns that are raised. 
A resolution letter or memo of agreement may prove beneficial even 
where a settlement agreement is unnecessary. Formal legal agreements are 
typically necessary only if there is payment to the employee, or if a court or 
regulatory agency requires documentation of withdrawal or related 
resolution.38 
III. BARRIERS AND GAPS IN STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
The following section describes limitations typically present in systems 
intended to encourage or protect whistleblowers. These limitations are often 
present in systems intended to encourage or protect whistleblowers.39  
As this article argues, these limitations mean that many public policy 
attempts in the United States to promote whistleblowing and advance 
potential societal or industrial benefits from whistleblowing activities  have 
failed to meet expectations.40 Although the individuals working within these 
systems are dedicated and hardworking, the tools and processes available to 
them are limited and often interfere with resolutions intended to uphold or 
encourage the exercise of whistleblower rights. 
Observing the programs that run parallel to the Council system in the 
federal nuclear complex, as well as from less extensive experience 
observing whistleblowing in other sectors, one can see many of these 
                                                                                                                              
where the conflict has proceeded too far to be resolvable through substantive changes in 
practices or workplace relationships, or in other exceptional circumstances. 
38 See HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13. 
39 Robert Vaughn, Whistleblower Protections and the Challenge to Public Employment 
Law, in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 182 
(2007) (discussing the challenges whistleblower protections impose on employment law). 
40 E.g., Richard Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65 (2007) 
[hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations]. 
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barriers.41 The prevalence of the following limiting factors has been found 
at Hanford as well as at other sites. The factors will be identified in italics, 
and their possible causes will be denoted in regular type. 
A.  Many regulatory systems only protect employment rights to blow the 
whistle without retaliation, and substantive issues or underlying 
conflicts that spawned the complaint are either not reachable by the 
program or not meaningfully addressed. 
1.  The failure to address underlying concerns may be due to 
limitations on agency or program jurisdiction, agency expertise 
or resources, or on access to candid and in depth information.42 
It may also be due to the fact that, in a system focused on 
employment rights, pressure falls on the employee to drop the 
issue, leave employment, or settle rather than suffer the 
challenges, stresses, and costs of the administrative processes. 
B.  The focus on proving fault through investigation and hearings creates 
posturing and defensiveness on both sides and precludes the candor 
necessary to find and address key issues and potential solutions. 
1.  When there is an important necessity of establishing agency 
jurisdiction, showing intent to enforce, establishing case law, or 
convincing a company or agency to use mediation alternatives, 
using a system that requires finding fault may be the only way 
to address a particular issue. However, it is normally not a 
useful approach even though parties often see a necessity to 
place blame or “teach a lesson” through a formal adjudication.   
 
                                                                                                                              
41 These conclusions are based on the author’s experience and observations centered on 
close observation and mediation of whistleblower cases at Hanford, as well as mediation, 
experience, and research in other settings intended to produce alternatives to complex and 
polarized legal and political disputes. 
42 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1), (b)(1) (describing where the right is defined related 
to employment discrimination, such as discharge or adverse action related to 
employment); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-
STANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
310/308767.pdf (exemplifying issues dealt with by OSHA). 
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C.  Lack of access to support and guidance normally needed for employees 
to file a claim likely to receive a full and fair examination. 
1.  Employees understandably find it difficult to manage the 
pressures and demands of working on a case against one’s 
employer while continuing employment, or to do so if one is 
unemployed and lacking normal income and support systems.  
2.  The employee may feel escalating levels of conflict and tension 
between himself and management, as well as with co-workers. 
3.  The whistleblower may lack confidence that his issue will be 
effectively handled if he or she does come forward. 
4.  Many internal and some agency programs are seen as beholden 
to employer interests; employees, therefore, perceive that they 
cannnot get support that they are willing or able to rely upon. 
D. Insufficient confidentiality or protection of information contributes to 
employee and employer reluctance to engage in problem solving.  
1.  The employee is concerned about exposing himself or herself to 
retaliation or other consequences from supervisors or peers. 
2.  The employer fears that candid exploration of the problem could 
be misinterpreted or misused or used to file other actions. 
3.  Witnesses may be reluctant due to fear of repercussions. 
4.  The possibility of posturing increases in non-confidential, 
unprotected settings, while the likelihood of candor and 
admission of error leading to solutions decreases. 
5.  Documentation requirements of some agencies or internal 
systems may preclude some employees, employers, unions, or 
others from engaging in a constructive resolution because of 
what might be required to have on the record. 
E.  The parties may perceive insufficient independence, balance, and 
objectivity in the process.43 
                                                                                                                              
43 Observations of the factors in this section (and other observations throughout this 
section and elsewhere in the paper), come from the author’s involvement in processing 
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1.  While many effective internal programs exist, it is also common 
for employees or factions of employees to not trust these 
internal employee concerns programs because these programs 
are controlled by the very employer against whom the employee 
is raising the concern. This may also be true of agency-
sponsored programs when employees do not perceive them as 
existing independently of the employer or being sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the issues. 
2.  People who have limited or no valuable knowledge or standing 
in the concern, have motivation to, and find ways to, influence 
the investigation and decisions surrounding the case. 
3.  Usually, such people’s interests are parochial and relate to old 
rivalries, perceived professional obligations, or concerns about 
having their own error exposed. 
F. Employers are often resistant to investigating whistleblower claims 
internally and to working with regulatory agencies tasked with 
investigating whistleblower complaints. 
1.  Lack of confidence on the part of the employer that the 
applicable regulatory or administrative agency has the expertise 
or objectivity to provide a fair adjudication of the claim. 
Employees often have these doubts as well.44 
2.  Economic or other penalties potentially facing the employer 
may create an impetus to resist rather than explore the claim.45 
3.  Mistakes in initial responses by inexperienced or 
unsophisticated supervisors and other employees may lead to 
violations of employee rights that then expose the company to 
liability. In such situations, employers often default to defensive 
                                                                                                                              
over a hundred cases through the Hanford Council system, as well as in processing and 
studying cases and conflicts in the other systems noted. 
44 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provisions Ten Years Later, 64 
S. C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (suggesting many difficulties and barriers in fulfilling public 
policy expectations of whistleblower protections). 
45 This comes from discussions about and observation of the response of many 
supervisors and managers to their perceptions of corporate or government expectations, 
or concerns about peer pressures, or failure to follow traditions. 
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postures, decreasing possibilities for effective resolution. 
4.  The tendency of offices responsible for defending claims is 
often to go quickly into “fight” mode, partly due to a lack of 
flexible tools, structure, or mandate for utilizing alternative 
approaches. In many existing programs, the threat of a lawsuit 
or other adversarial actions places these agents automatically on 
the defensive. This is often executed using traditional methods 
for preparing for adversarial proceedings, which often has the 
effect of further polarizing the conflict and moving further away 
from the actual issues.  On the other hand, many professionals in 
these offices and the advocates who oppose them in court, when 
involved with the Council system, are able to constructively 
engage in problem solving. Hence, this is most likely a failure of 
the systems, tools, and structure of the processes available to 
them and not necessarily a failure of individual intentions, 
talent, or willingness to put forth effort.   
5.  Only rarely is it that the management that can sufficiently affect 
the underlying causes and relationships fundamentally involved 
in resolving these issues once the complaint becomes an issue 
for the legal office or for formal labor relations treatment. 
6.  Employers sometimes attempt to reach resolutions or prevail in 
adversarial proceedings through the involvement of subject 
matter experts.46 Although expert advice may be successful in 
some cases, the result is more likely to be polarizing. The 
employee’s lawyer simply finds a competing expert. Besides, 
most polarized whistleblower cases have dimensions beyond 
technical disagreements, such as trust issues or traditions or 
long-unaddressed issues that must be considered in order to 
address the underlying issues and resolve the conflict.47  
7. Typically, internal and external whistleblower programs have 
neither the mandate nor the tools to address a sufficient range of 
                                                                                                                              
46 Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2 (describing attempted resolutions through 
primary subject matter). 
47 Id. 
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the conflict’s aspects.48 Particularly well-developed employee 
concerns programs can be exceptions to certain of these role and 
tool problems, but they are not the norm. Consistent exceptions 
are found in plants covered by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission49 and in some other specific contexts, such as in 
situations where companies have invested in robust programs 
that address the full range of issues, including technical issues. 
G.  Forces within the workforce and workplace discourage employees from 
blowing the whistle. 
1.  Many of these disputes involve peer pressure and ostracizing of 
employees, neither of which can adequately be addressed in 
court action, settlements based on employment rights, or 
through typical internal investigations and solutions. Such 
conflicts present challenges to unions due to the difficulties 
presented by internal strife and peer-to-peer resentments. 
2.   Many of these cases lead employees and management to choose 
sides and, subsequently, to try to influence outcomes even 
though they lack access to facts that might later be discovered. 
The impacts on work relationships can be personally and 
institutionally devastating. 
3.  It is also common for a convenient and non-factual “narrative” 
to develop about the situation, which may preclude upper 
management from making an objective examination of the 
situation, despite a sincere desire to do so. Generally, these 
narratives include a negative depiction of the employee who 
raised the whistleblower complaint, undermining his or her 
credibility and motivations. In the Council’s experience, these 
narratives are almost always exaggerated, frequently inaccurate, 
and based substantially on personality clashes or a defensive 
posturing rather than on actual work behavior. This narrative 
may drive decisions that are not buttressed by a closer, de novo 
                                                                                                                              
48 See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1. 
49 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N. 
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look at the situation.50 
H.  Resolutions reached by administrative and regulatory agencies, courts, 
and other traditional bodies often lack finality and stability. 
1.   The availability and common uses of appeals steps often means 
that first steps in investigations and adjudications in many 
administrative procedures have become meaningless because of  
parties’ penchant to appeal.51 
2.   A win-lose system encourages the use of appeals. A system that 
more fully addresses both parties’ underlying issues does not as 
frequently result in a loser that feels the need to appeal, or a 
company or employee that feels compelled to use other means 
to achieve key objectives. 
3.   Ongoing conflict affects not just the employee involved in the 
issue, but also witnesses, supervisors, management, other 
employees, union representatives, and staff that may have been 
involved through ancillary duties.  The original issue is 
frequently still languishing and the interpersonal and other 
workplace conflicts are left to worsen. 
4. If the remedies available are restricted to adjudicating 
employment rights, many important items will be left 
unresolved (and, often, to fester) for a future conflict.  
                                                                                                                              
50 This is a common observation in cases received by the Council, especially the most 
polarized and complex. I am indebted to attorney Billie Pirner Garde for helping to 
describe and recognize this and many other phenomena and patterns in whistleblower 
cases. 
51 Many attorneys who practice in this area, some of whom have interacted with the 
Council, have described that the appeals processes in some programs are seen as more 
favorable or at least inevitable. Consequently, their attention to or faith in the initial 
investigation by the administrative agency has, unfortunately, been reduced. The 
workload in some of these administrative processes relative to the resources available has 
also impaired the timeliness and, sometimes, thoroughness of what can be done at those 
levels, further reducing the confidence that one side or the other has in the initial 
administrative investigations. The relative finality of the Council process (presumptive 
implementation) is the factor that makes it attractive to many of the parties, and, in 
particular, to the employee advocates and senior corporate officials involved. 
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IV. HOW THE HANFORD COUNCIL SYSTEM WORKS TO ADDRESS 
THESE COMMON LIMITATIONS52 
The Council operates within a Charter agreement, which establishes 
parameters and authorities for the Council, but allows adaptation of 
methods to the issues and dynamics in each dispute.53 The Council Charter, 
with modest exceptions, provides authority to address the full range of 
issues and guards against other typical limitations to addressing 
whistleblower case resolution by providing the following: 
A.  Support and guidance for exercising rights 
1.  The Council system provides the employee regular contact with 
staff and selected members of the Council to help the employee 
understand his rights, alternatives, and approaches to dealing 
with the stresses of the process.54 While the Council does not 
provide legal advice (and while employees are free to seek it) 
very few employees find the need to seek legal advice because 




52 See generally JONATHAN BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE: JOINT 
RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR DISPUTES 217–54 (2007) [hereinafter BROCK, 
BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE]; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1. 
53 The concept of having a “Charter” document to capture the authorities and related 
basic agreements about Council operation was the creation of Gerald Cormick, a 
distinguished mediator who followed up after the 1992 University of Washington study. 
He brought the parties together around the concepts in the study to see if a workable 
mechanism could be built on these concepts. Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 
1, at 508–09. 
54 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 13, at 5. Usually, an 
employee advocate representative is assigned to be the primary liaison for employees 
with a case before the Council. Normally, the employee and the representative will speak 
regularly, often weekly or more often, to be sure that the Council is updated on the 
situation and the employee is aware of developments and needs in the assessment and in 
the development of a resolution. This creates a valuable channel for avoiding surprises, 
for information exchange, for problem solving as things arise, and for greater trust and 
clarity when the resolution is available for presentation. Employees may call other 
members of the Council if they wish, including company representatives, and often do so. 
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2.   The Council examines the situation de novo. It does not rely on 
prior reports, rumors or assumptions about the situation or the 
employee. The Council begins by listening to the initial 
presentations of the employee without judgment or argument, 
and then commits to an objective assessment, including 
solicitation of company views. The assessment process contains 
deliberate steps and check-ins so that the issues of concern, or in 
contention, are fully explored and the conclusions are unlikely 
to be a surprise. Part of the mediation agreement that the parties 
(company and employee) must sign is a promise that the 
employee and company will cooperate with the process and 
participate constructively as requested.55 
B.  Protection from retaliation, escalation, and associated stresses 
1.  The tools used by the Council are tailored to the circumstances 
and include consistency with applicable law, bargaining 
agreements, and more.  For example, the Council system is able 
to introduce specific protections, such as removing the 
employee to a different work area, forestalling an upcoming 
evaluation, or even a pending termination, or taking other 
temporary measures to prevent escalation and additional stress.56 
2.  Others in the company that might have a role in the 
investigation of the concern, or other aspects of the case, are 
normally required to fully suspend these activities. In addition, 
supervisory or administrative contacts with the employee are 
also carefully managed during the case in order to preclude 
actions that could exacerbate tensions and divert focus from the 
                                                                                                                              
55 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, JOINT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (May 
2008), available at http://www.hanfordconcernscouncil.org/download/joint_mou.pdf 
[hereinafter HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. The 
Council requires that a mediation agreement (or Memorandum of Understanding—MOU) 
be signed by the employee and employer and the Council that outlines mutual 
requirements and expectations. Id. This includes confidentiality, cooperation, and the 
expectation that other processes will be put on hold while the Council works on the case. 
Id. This provides additional confidentiality protection to all and a reminder of expected 
behaviors and obligations. Id. 
56 Charter, supra note 7, § 7.5 (discussing stabilization). 
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problem solving work and the day-to-day jobs of company and 
employee. In the event of a business need to contact the 
employee during a case, such contacts are normally coordinated 
with the Council in order to avoid misunderstandings or 
prejudicial actions by either party.57 Usually, a specific protocol 
is worked out with the employee’s chain of command.    
3.  Neither party may start new proceedings in connection with the 
issue or work outside the Council system on the case while the 
Council has jurisdiction. If they do, the Council will normally 
cease work.58 This prohibition helps keep everyone focused on 
the problem solving process and minimizes posturing and other 
activities that reduce candor and divert energy from resolution.59 
C. Problem solving focus and blame-free approach keeps the effort on 
solutions and avoids further polarization and conflict 
1.  A problem solving focus and the employment of techniques 
designed to achieve resolution also represents a break from what 
has usually been, up to that point, an escalating conflict between 
the parties, typified by defensive statements and related 
posturing by both parties. 
                                                                                                                              
57 Id. § 7.5.2. 
58 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55. 
In my experience, if there is another ongoing process through OSHA, the DOE, the court, 
or elsewhere, attention is diverted, trust eroded, and sometimes processes are “played” 
against each other. Thus, the Council has made it a practice not to work on a case if that 
case is active in another process. A grievance on an unrelated item or adjudication of a 
health concern—which the Council does not perform—may go on at the same time if the 
Council determines that this does not interfere with the Council’s process. Through the 
MOU, the Council gets the employer and employee to approach the sponsor of any 
process that has been started and request a “freeze” in the process without any party 
giving up rights to restart the process. Often this requires the employee or the company or 
both to make a formal request to such agencies and agents. Id. 
59 Discussions with Council members who have been advocates for whistleblowers in 
courts, in administrative processes, and with company members produced this insight 
about their greater willingness to candidly and creatively participate in Council cases. 
This is also a common occurrence in mediation, and among the reasons for 
confidentiality being a common element of most mediation practices. Brock, Full and 
Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 516. 
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2.  The purposes of the blame-free, problem solving mandate are to 
find a reasonable solution to the underlying problem, keep the 
project on track, improve safety culture, repair the damaged 
workplace trust and relationships, and to otherwise restore (or 
minimize damage to) career trajectory.   
3.  Members of the Council are appointed with this mandate. 
Council procedures that begin with assessment and proceed to 
build a blame-free solution reflect this approach.60 
4.  The blame-free approach, combined with confidentiality, 
usually produces candor, a willingness to solve problems, and a 
reduction in the need for defensive activities and statements. 
5.  Consensus resolution creates strong support among the company 
representatives and CEO, employee advocates, and the affected 
employee for the resolution; it also protects Council members 
from fear of being “outvoted.” Risks of instability from appeals 
or effective opposition are, thus, minimized.  
D.  Presence of Council members from both advocacy and company 
perspectives, who are familiar with the site, relevant safety practices, 
and applicable laws and rights, enables balanced and credible 
resolutions61 
                                                                                                                              
60 Members receive and sign a letter of appointment that specifies their responsibility to 
seek solutions, to maintain confidentiality, and to follow other practices that contribute to 
resolving issues. Charter, supra note 7, § 4.5. They also receive material that describes 
the function of the members in the various Council positions and the common 
commitment to creating resolutions. Id. 
61 The following outline pertains to the discussion in this section, and elsewhere in the 
paper, on the membership composition of the Council, which is a specific design feature 
of the system. This balanced membership feature and other features of the Hanford 
Council system are premised, in part, on features of a system developed in the 1970s to 
deal with polarized and contentious issues in police and firefighter bargaining in 
Massachusetts. BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 217–54. This 
chapter describes the importance of such features in developing a successful conflict 
resolution system in circumstances that otherwise tend to fall towards polarization and 
solutions that do not address the causes of the conflict. Id. Similar features can be found 
in other standing systems, including those referred to above in fisheries, health care and 
elsewhere, and are the principles that underlie much of private arbitration and mediation 
 
Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection Systems 601 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013 
1.  Presence of senior, experienced corporate officers in the system 
a)  Bypassing supervisory, mid-level, and staff offices in 
decision making (but not for input or testimony on the issues) 
precludes those who were parties to the conflict, or who 
might normally be charged with automatically defending the 
company from biasing the assessment or recommendations, 
allows a fresh discussion of the issues without emotion or 
pride in the way, and avoids influence of the negative 
narrative that often builds up. 
b)  While it seems unusual to some to have employer 
representatives involved directly and candidly in problem 
solving, employer involvement provides knowledge of site 
and company practices, as well as of dynamics within the 
company common to whistleblower disputes. The presence of 
these corporate players speeds access to information and 
helps the Council collect facts, keeping solutions consistent 
with mission and organizational goals. It also creates 
advocates within the company for the recommended 
resolution.   
c)  Direct access by the Council via the company representatives 
and Chair of the Council to the company president for 
recommendations protects confidentiality and provides 
authority for policy and practice changes and allocation of 
resources to the solution. Lower levels do not have the 
authority to change behaviors and policies, to take 
exceptional actions, or to authorize most stabilization actions. 
The ability to take a well-formed conclusion and resolution to 
the company president precludes the parochial biases in other 
quarters from influencing the decisions on whistleblower 
cases. The company president takes the most complete view 
of corporate and site missions and interests, and normally 
finds the Council resolution to be far preferable to available 
alternatives, particularly those framed by the case’s initial 
                                                                                                                              
clauses in commercial contracts. See Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 
517–19. 
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trajectory into conflict mode prior to Council involvement.62 
d)  The presence of senior company representatives in the 
Council system gives the company president confidence in 
the recommendation. Recommendations only go forward if 
they are a product of consensus.63 
2.  Presence of respected employee advocates in the system64 
a)  The employee advocates on the Council have experience with 
aggrieved individuals, can help interpret concerns that people 
often have when raising whistleblower issues, and can better 
anticipate the value of contemplated solutions. 
b)  These employee advocates ensure that the matter is fully 
explored relative to the concerns of the employee and that the 
matter is appropriately resolved. 
c)  The advocate members of the Hanford Council ensure that 
solutions are consistent with the whistleblower’s rights under 
law and that the resolutions will resolve the issues that gave 
rise to the concern. The advocates also help the others in the 
Council system to be aware of how an employee will 
experience the actions taken by the Council to assess and 
resolve the case. This proves to be very helpful in gaining 
credibility and in facilitating practical resolutions. Employee 
advocate members also play a crucial part in providing initial 
credibility to the system, support to employees during the 
process, wisdom in seeking practical resolutions and 
protecting rights, and confidence and substance to the 
outcomes. 
                                                                                                                              
62 This has been the ongoing experience in Council interaction with CEO’s regarding 
Council resolutions, as predicted in the University of Washington study. Inst. Pub. Pol’y 
and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 516. My 
experience continues to affirm the value seen in this process by CEOs as opposed to 
alternative methods, though the degree of engagement and interest naturally varies. 
63 Charter, supra note 7, §§ 2.6, 1.2. 
64 Id. § 4.2.3; Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, 
supra note 1, at 517–19; HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 
13, at 5. 
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d)  As with the exclusion of corporate personnel who had been 
previously involved in the case or who might represent the 
case in later proceedings, should the Council process fail, 
advocacy members of the Council are similarly restricted to 
those who have not taken a position, and who would not be 
involved with future representation. This also protects 
independence and confidentiality of Council system 
activities.65 
E.  Capacity and mandate to address the full range of issues in the case, 
which may include safety systems and practices, culture and 
interpersonal issues, and harm or potential harm to the employees 
career66 
1.  The Council system increases chances of resolution and lowers 
odds of lingering issues leading to new conflict by creating 
solutions that deal with the range of safety, employment, 
interpersonal, policy, and workplace issues that may be present.  
2.  A comprehensive resolution also makes it more likely that the 
precipitating cause is addressed. 
3.  Because employers, advocacy groups, and the DOE endorse the 
Council system, Council recommendations are expected to be 
implemented. When any of that support is in doubt, the 
resolution is less likely to be stable. Any voluntary system that 
seeks to supplement existing systems needs the support of the 
authoritative and influential parties who would otherwise use 
existing statutory and administrative systems. 
F.  Confidentiality helps the Council system to preclude forces and 
considerations that interfere with exploring underlying causes and a 
creative search for options67 
 
                                                                                                                              
65  Charter, supra note 7, § 6.1.2 (requiring that a member recuse himself or herself if an 
actual or potential conflict of interest arises).  
66 Inst. Pub. Pol’y and Mgmt., supra note 2; Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 
1, at 500–02. 
67 Charter, supra note 7, § 5.0. 
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1.  Confidentiality keeps out extraneous considerations and 
pressures on decision-makers and contributes to lowering the 
stress and pressures on the employee and managers who may 
have been involved and who may feel as if pride is on the line. 
2.  Confidentiality, recusal and related process protections 
contribute to an independent and calm examination of the 
issues, and allow not only a full examination of what occurred 
and what did not, but also an exploration (and discarding, as 
appropriate) of a wide range of alternatives that can include 
strategic considerations and implications well beyond the 
mandate of narrower internal or agency systems.    
3.  Confidentiality, recusal, and related processes help to quickly 
and thoroughly bring in information and considerations that 
focus on addressing the problems that gave rise to the initial 
complaint and led to the subsequent conflict. Confidentiality 
reduces the defensiveness common to on-the-record and 
adjudicatory or administrative proceedings, and, therefore, 
allows greater exploration of problems and alternatives. These 
features can establish the assurance that the neither party is 
placed in a disadvantageous position should the mediation fail.68 
5.  Confidentiality keeps these cases out of the newspapers and out 
of the gossip chain (made the worse by electronic 
communications) and, thereby, reduces the diversion and other 
harms that otherwise result from the high level of gossip and 
rumors that frequently accompany such cases. All gossip cannot 
be stopped, but confidentiality leads to a noticeable reduction in 
volume and impact, which is highly beneficial in keeping focus 
on the issues and saving the energy of those who should not be 
involved. No case before the Council has been the subject of a 
news story once the Council took the case, though most similar 
cases outside the Council’s jurisdiction (e.g., in non-
participating companies) often are. 
 
                                                                                                                              
68 Id. § 6.1.2. 
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G.  Flexibility of tools to fit the issues 
1.  While available tools are not limitless, the Council system is not 
locked into one set of procedures and can select approaches, 
tools, and remedies that it believes, by consensus, are likely to 
be effective. For example, if a case requires outside experts, the 
Council can bring in experts—chosen by agreement of all 
seats—and the experts thus engaged are everyone’s experts to 
freshly examine the designated issues. If the case requires 
involvement of the employee in a reform effort to address an 
inadequate policy, the Council system can arrange for this to 
occur. If the situation requires stabilization, or if certain actions 
need to be frozen while the case is addressed, this can usually be 
done consistent with ongoing project needs.69 
2.  Limits of resources and authority certainly exist but, in general, 
the focus on solution rather than process provides more ways to 
succeed.  
H.  Agreement on the system by the participating parties, a clear 
relationship to other existing systems,70 and rights pertaining to safety 
and resolution of employment rights conflicts 
1.  The Council system depends on the Charter agreement to which 
participating companies and participating advocacy groups 
agree.71  This combination of clarity and agreement contributes 
                                                                                                                              
69 See, e.g., id. §§ 1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.4, 1.3, 2.5, 2.6.3, 2.7, 7.5, 7.7, 9.1.6, 9.2.  
These provisions illustrate that the Council is not bound to any one process or type of 
resolution, and may approach cases as it deems necessary within the bounds of the 
charter. 
70 BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 244. See also JONATHAN 
BROCK ET AL., WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS CTR., RUCKELSHAUS CENTER REPORT: THE 
SHARED STRATEGY FOR PUGET SOUND: A DESCRIPTION AND INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF 
COLLABORATIVE SALMON RECOVERY PLANNING IN WASHINGTON STATE AS OF JUNE 
2008 (2008), available at http://pcc.wsu.edu/projects/documents/ 
SharedStrategyFinalReport-summaryonly.pdf [hereinafter BROCK ET AL., THE SHARED 
STRATEGY] (discussing a dispute that concerned developing a plan to recover salmon in 
the Puget Sound, the estuary on which Seattle, Tacoma, and other cities sit). 
71 First-hand experience of the Charter’s reviews for improvements and adjustments by 
joint teams of corporate, advocacy, neutral members, and with the cooperation of the 
DOE, most prominently in 2004 and 2005. 
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to flexibility and stability and shows the relationship to existing 
rights and processes.  
2.  The Charter specifies the mandate in terms of types of cases 
(e.g., safety and environmental health cases are included, but 
classified data, financial, or workers’ compensation cases are 
not) and authorities (e.g., consensus requirement to gain 
implementation or stabilization authority).72 
3.  Existing rights are protected and not overridden,73 but the 
parties can agree to defer exercise of those rights and must do so 
for the time the Council is working on the case. If a case is taken 
into the system, the Council has exclusive jurisdiction and 
engages the cooperation of agencies to put the agency case on 
hold for a specified time period. However, the employee may 
leave the Council process at any time.74 
                                                                                                                              
72 Charter, supra note 7, § 1.2.2 (listing the areas where the Council may not do case 
work, including areas involving classified information). 
73 During the Charter development process, the principle of preserving the rights of the 
parties was recognized as important to encouraging employees, but also prospective 
participating companies. Brock, Full and Fair Resolution, supra note 1, at 511. If an 
employee was to give up a right to sue or pursue administrative processes, spending 
months in the Council’s mediation process would seem much less attractive, particularly 
since aggrieved employees are not trustful of the employer at that point, nor are they 
familiar with the Council. Id. Similarly, employers often are not trustful of an employee’s 
good faith at that stage of the conflict. Id. The shared strategy also resulted in a seminal 
decision to protect tribal rights to fisheries, although many other parties sought to restrict 
them as a condition of the conflict resolution process, and the rights and authorities of 
agencies and other players were not altered in statute. Id. In practice, new structures for 
developing consensus recommendations changed how these rights and authorities were 
exercised and how problems were evaluated prior to taking action. Id. The shared 
strategy system, approved by the federal Government like the Council, is a much larger 
scale example of a mediation system that supplements, but does not replace existing 
authorities for oversight, regulation, and managing the tasks. Id. 
74 HANFORD CONCERNS COUNCIL, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 55 
(containing provisions for putting other processes on hold, as well as the parties’ 
agreement to continue to do so, or leave the Council process, and allowing the employee 
the option to leave). Mediation is by definition a voluntary process, as opposed to a 
process like binding arbitration, or a contractual agreement to arbitrate certain kinds of 
disputes. The MOU also states that the parties will “leave the case to the Council” while 
it is in the Council’s jurisdiction, precluding other actions to affect or process the case. Id. 
Filling the Holes in Whistleblower Protection Systems 607 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013 
4.  The proposed resolution requires consensus, protecting the 
rights and interests of all, but the method of appointments, 
process of examination, confidentiality, and other structural 
features provide the Council with independence and a problem 
solving focus to ensure the prospects for reaching consensus. 
5.  Once reached and approved, Council resolutions may be 
implemented through the employer’s normal systems (e.g., 
changed job assignment or normal systems for revising 
practices).75 
6.  Also, any violations of law or regulation must be reported.76 The 
format for reporting is usually determined by which party or what 
mechanism is required to make the report.   
7.  The Council system, while independent of the company, 
advocacy groups, and government agencies, is largely a 
supplement to the rest of the safety and personnel apparatus.   
a)  The Council exercises independent judgment and proposes 
action to which other company processes must defer as 
required by the Charter. The Council resolution is fashioned 
                                                                                                                              
75 Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6. While the Council gains a form of temporary authority to 
handle the issue, the fact that its recommendation goes to the president of the affected 
company is emblematic of the fact that it is the president’s authority over the company 
that will allow the specifics of the recommendation to proceed. Id. This ability is subject 
to what is legal under the company’s contract with the DOE. Id. Rights and processes are 
established through collective bargaining contracts and other applicable laws. Id. Because 
of company representation on the Council, these items are normally anticipated or can be 
worked through in the implementation. Id. The Council chair, for example, has no 
authority to hire, transfer, expend corporate funds, or to mandate changes in engineering 
or other safety processes. Id. Thus, the charter refers to a “consensus recommendation” 
made to the president of the affected company that will be “presumptively implemented.” 
Id. The latter term was carefully chosen to indicate that the recommendation could be 
rejected only in rare and relatively specific instances. No recommendation has ever been 
rejected. Id. 
76 Id. § 5.7. Particularly because nuclear safety is a very specialized area and heavily 
regulated, the parties developing the charter recognized the necessity of maintaining the 
integrity of safety reporting systems and keeping the employees and company in 
compliance with nuclear safety requirements, while preserving confidentiality of 
mediation. Id. 
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creatively in response to the overall set of issues: it extends 
beyond the jurisdiction of any one program, agency, or 
section of the corporation, but integrates into a single solution 
package and may include case-specific items as well as 
system repair aspects. 
b)  Council-proposed resolutions have to be within applicable 
law and within existing systems of managing employment 
and operations on the site. Often, specific coordination, or 
even sign-off, is required if the matter had previously been 
before a court or regulatory authority and was deferred or 
referred to the Council system. If a grievance procedure was 
suspended in deference to the Council process, the union 
would have to agree that the matter is resolved and withdraw 
the grievance. The Council works as needed with union 
leadership and employee relations representatives to ensure 
consistency with collectively bargained rights. 
c)  Partly through these forms of coordination with entities that 
are protecting rights of the employee or employer, the results 
of the Council’s supplemental system gains legitimacy. This 
finality contributes to precluding recriminations or appeal.77 
d)  Importantly, statutes, regulations, and related administrative 
procedures provide employees with standing and require the 
employer to be attentive (though many company and agency 
leaders are highly interested in these issues anyway). 
However, these statutorily established systems may not, by 
themselves, be sufficiently protective or stabilizing because 
of the lack the breadth of jurisdiction or resources to fully 
solve the issues in a particular setting or circumstance.78   
                                                                                                                              
77 Dwight Golan & Eric E. Van Loon, Legal Issues in Consensus Building, in THE 
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 495, 506 (1999) (discussing recommendations to the 
authority of the affected company’s president and legal and contractual requirements he 
or she is required to follow); Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6. 
78 JOHN T. DUNLOP & ARNOLD M. ZACK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 44–45 (1997) (reference at the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) during the mid-1990s that introduced mediation and other practices 
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e)  Thus, supplementing these statutory systems and derivative 
practices may be a beneficial response to meeting policy 
goals of more robust protection and examination and stable 
resolution of the substantive problems that employees are 
asked to bring forward, as well as the attendant conflicts.  
8.  Without being linked to a statutory requirement for 
whistleblower protection, a supplemental system like the 
Council system would engender even more opposition, and 
might be seen as an interloper or a nuisance. Having an agreed 
upon protocol, like the Charter, that defines the authorities and 
tools as they relate to existing rights, obligations, and 
procedures is critical in order to create a trustworthy and 
effective system in which all parties know what to expect. In 
design and in practice, mapping the supplemental system 
carefully in relation to existing authorities, and specifically 
considering where to place authority for moving a case to the 
supplemental system and how to gain implementation are of 
critical importance. 
9.  Because both employee advocates and employer representatives 
are involved, resolutions have a level of practicality and 
acceptability that would be missing if the resolutions had been 




to reduce backlogs and increase effectiveness of the EEOC’s employment discrimination 
mandate). 
79 BROCK, BARGAINING BEYOND IMPASSE, supra note 52, at 244; e.g., BROCK ET AL., 
THE SHARED STRATEGY, supra note 70. This study describes, in detail, from more than a 
hundred interviews and extensive document review, the principle of joint membership 
from all sides of the issue and involvement of the levels of authority that were involved. 
Id. It also describes how the consensus work of the entities established was mapped into 
existing state, federal, tribal, county, municipal authorities and regulations. Id. The shared 
strategy structure, the primary conflict over management of salmon to promote recovery 
of listed species under the Endangered Species Act, is perhaps the largest such policy 
mediation in recent US history, as well as the first to provide a mediated, local alternative 
to a federal listing. Id. 
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V. WHY IT WORKS AND HOW THE PRINCIPLES MIGHT BE APPLIED 
TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING SYSTEMS 
A number of unique but theory-based principles help to explain why the 
Council system provides a valuable supplement. Among them is the mixed 
and balanced membership of the Council, which results in a greater capacity 
to positively affect site practices. Thus, underlying problems can be 
recognized and addressed during assessment and development of 
recommendations, and internal company officers can advocate for the 
solution and its implementation. If a participating company has a 
commitment to presumptively implement cases resolved with a consensus 
recommendation, the resolutions will encourage employees and advocates 
to have faith in the system and will ensure that the Council’s time is not 
wasted. Furthermore, the employer will know that it will not be asked to 
implement a recommendation that is not supported by the corporate 
advocate, as well as by the employee advocate and neutral members of the 
Council.80 
Resolutions of the Council normally include steps that improve the 
systems and practices in the workplace from which the complaint came. 
One result is that companies learn new ways to get ahead of many safety, 
health, or retaliation issues through the informal interaction and problem 
solving in the system. This system also improves the problem solving 
awareness of many senior managers, who have often expressed gratitude for 
the chance to serve on the Council.81 At the same time, affected employees 
have their status and career trajectory restored. And even in the rare 
instance of an employee leaving employment, it is by a resolution he or she 
has accepted. This will at least end the argument and allow the employee to 
go on with his or her life, and allow the employer to go on with the project. 
Under almost any Council system outcome, appeals, recriminations, and 
                                                                                                                              
80 Charter, supra note 7, § 2.6 (discussing consensus). 
81 This is a frequent comment from departing and past Council members. 
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other ways of continuing the conflict are largely precluded.   
Thus, this special mediation process at Hanford demonstrates how 
attention to the nuanced features of whistleblower conflicts and the gaps in 
the typical channels available can lead to better results for whistleblowers 
and employers. This is best done by supplemental steps that retain a 
relationship to existing systems and rights, but which reflect the need for 
independence and confidentiality. Gaining these benefits does not require 
the specific system used at Hanford, but successful systems do require 
dealing with the issues of independence, confidentiality, protection, 
stabilization, support, flexible tools, in depth and rapid assessment of the 
underlying issues, use of local authority and knowledge, and means of 
guaranteeing implementation, among others.   
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LESSONS FROM THE COUNCIL SYSTEM 
Features of the Hanford Council system could be made a part of many 
internal complaint resolution systems and some regulatory systems, or 
could be established as independent and supplemental to those systems.  
(Issues in structuring and managing existing regulatory programs represent 
a separate topic, worthy of their own exploration.) Although some cases 
should be litigated or used to set or alter policy, most of the adversarial-
based programs do not contain sufficient channels, protections, tools, and 
structures to encourage, protect, and ultimately solve whistleblower issues.  
A system that could produce consistent problem resolution and encourage 
people to come forward would seem to need more features, breadth, and 
flexibility, which can lead to real problem solving, than are generally 
available.  The new whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank appear to have many of these broader features, as well as 
additional challenges.82 Perhaps principles in the Council system that 
                                                                                                                              
82 See generally Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 40. 
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respond to limiting factors in many statutory, judicial, regulatory, and 
administrative channels are features that can, at least on some scale (perhaps 
even with some of the newer statutes) be used to supplement what might 
otherwise be in place, thereby adding to the likelihood of intended results.   
Furthermore, other “supplements” to the simple investigatory and 
adversarial model have also been successfully used. For example, the 
EEOC, under the leadership of Chairman Paul Miller in the mid-1990s,83 
developed a “tracked” system whereby concerns that seemed to need 
investigation could be put on a “track” where they would be investigated. 
Cases that seemed susceptible to mediation went to a newly trained cadre 
and system that was prepared for this purpose. With these and other 
reforms, the results showed major reductions in backlog.84 Where they are 
not already, triage and “tracking” of cases can be part of agency or 
corporate systems in order to help set priorities and provide the appropriate 
treatment to different types of cases, as well as to allocate resources more 
effectively.  
 Greater use of interim protection reduces extraneous pressures and 
posturing while the case is assessed and can also be a part of corporate 
systems; such interim protection could perhaps be more widely permitted or 
encouraged in agency practices, though statutory considerations may affect 
possibilities. In another application, the internal employee complaints or 
concerns investigation functions can be more fully and consistently 
independent of other functions. To avoid the inevitable biases, and often 
more limited mandate and perspective, that seem to come from mid-levels 
in the organization, the investigatory function can report directly to the 
CEO and eschew contact or involvement with other parties who have their 
own opinions or interests in the outcome. For related reasons, such 
                                                                                                                              
83 DUNLOP & ZACK, supra note 78. 
84 Id. at 152 (describing how mediation and arbitration can be used in administrative 
agencies). 
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programs could have stricter confidentiality practices, as many already do. 
Without strict confidentiality practices, internal program risks being 
captured by the negative narrative and pressures that minimize the issues 
and the employee’s credibility. Insufficient confidentiality will reduce 
opportunities for candor and trust. At times, the employee may be wrong or, 
in some instances, wrongly motivated, but a truly independent assessment 
will identify that if it is present. Confidentiality can help to deal with this 
result in ways that contribute to maintaining a safe environment in which 
people can come forward. Just as a corporation will more likely cooperate if 
its pride and dignity can be protected during a process, employees are more 
likely to accept responsibility, or a different outcome than they hoped for, if 
they are similarly respected by the process. This is made more difficult 
when they know that the person before them in the queue has a report in a 
file that reads “not substantiated.” Clearly, there are many typical barriers 
that we know can be addressed by supplementary mechanisms and that can 
benefit from the principles in this article.   
The following list summarizes key principles identified in this article that 
could be considered for use in developing, or otherwise supplementing 
many existing programs and systems for addressing whistleblower 
concerns:    
1. Ensuring that the most appropriate tools are being used for resolving 
the issues and conflicts in the case; ensuring flexibility and breadth 
in the tool kit; 
2. Using more mediation and other supplemental methods that do not 
require having a winner and a loser, or otherwise reducing the risks 
for both parties to engage in real problem solving; 
3. Including representatives from both sides of the dispute who are 
knowledgeable of the issues and sufficiently respected to be able to 
help persuade the employee and company to accept the resolution 
and to increase practicality and acceptability of the resolution; 
4. Structuring systems to address substantive concerns as well as 
retaliation and employment impacts that are protected by statute; 
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5. Providing more independence to whistleblower case assessments; 
6. Using strict confidentiality practices to help keep the program and 
case assessments independent and free from gossip, workplace 
pressures, biases, and conflicts of interest, and to help promote 
candor and creativity; 
7. Relying on a non-adversarial process focused on problem solving 
rather than on finding fault; 
8. Providing stability and otherwise reducing pressures, stresses, and 
escalation while the concern is addressed; 
9. Including stabilization protections to prevent escalation and provide 
ongoing guidance to an employee so that he or she can manage the 
inevitable stresses of working through the resolution; 
10. Preserving the rights of all parties in the event the process does not 
solve the problem and increasing their security to enter the process; 
11. Bypassing the levels and functions in the organization that tend to 
focus only on certain parts of the picture or have reasons to be 
defensive; precluding those with a vested interest from involvement; 
12. Delivering the results to the president or other higher level  in the 
company with the authority to take action and the perspective to see 
the full set of organizational implications; 
13. Establishing the forum and setting to allow a full opportunity for 
quiet and deliberate assessment and solution development; 
14. Creating accountability for fair outcomes and mutual confidence of 
the employer and employee community; and, 
15. Linking the system appropriately to existing recognized and related 
sources of authority and rights so that the process and solution will 
have legitimacy; making it a supplement, not a substitute. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of established rights or the threat of enforcement, 
litigation, or other consequences, these more cooperative methods and 
supplemental methods would likely not bring people to the table. Although 
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these supplements are only part of the policy picture and tool kit, they can 
make existing rights much more effective by eliminating or reducing gaps 
in tools and tendencies that actually create instability in processes and 
intended resolutions. Without such supplements to many existing and 
emerging systems, workers that come forward will be without adequate 
means to have their concerns fairly and effectively evaluated and resolved, 
or will not come forward at all because the stakes are too high. Companies 
will continue to adopt postures that are primarily defensive because of the 
risks they face. The result will be continued frustration and failure to match 
policy intent.  
By examining the Hanford Council system example, an interested 
observer can find prospects for allowing and encouraging supplemental 
systems to be tailored to industry or local circumstances, while remaining 
related to existing law and rights and systems for carrying the business 
forward. Because the Hanford Council system successfully addresses 
limitations common to existing whistleblower programs, these principles for 
a more effective system have promise in application elsewhere. Without any 
change in law, most, if not all, of the features discussed in this paper can be 
used in many settings to get better outcomes if established in relation to 
specific industries, workplace situations, and other circumstances.85 The 
Hanford Council system should not be cloned, but its lessons can provide 
principles, tools, or techniques that can be applied. 
Such supplementary processes can, without new legislation—and 
particularly with the unsatisfactory default alternative to return to 
adversarial pathway, be implemented via agreement between union and 
management, by agency and a company or industry—perhaps as part of 
settling an enforcement action or legal dispute, or by agreement between 
whistleblower advocates and a company or industry, or by other means.  
                                                                                                                              
85 See, e.g., id.; BROCK ET AL., THE SHARED STRATEGY, supra note 70. 
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Certainly these principles could be used to inform new legislation and 
agency reform. In this context, there are opportunities to streamline and 
otherwise improve the structure of whistleblower legislation and 
enforcement, which has grown up over decades in response to many 
different problems and pressures.  In the meantime, much can be done.  
The Hanford Council system shows how one voluntary (but specifically 
structured) system, set up to supplement existing systems, employs 
principles that can work in a wide variety of settings and programs. Only if 
we can find ways to provide the tools and features necessary to overcome 
the inherent weaknesses in typical structures for whistleblower protection 
can we redeem the promise of rights to whistleblowers and hopes for 
discovering and addressing the issues we wish them to raise. 
